Inside Out
Political Reforms

An In-Depth Analysis of the
Issues with our Political System
And an Innovative Solution

After years of rigorous research and in-depth analysis of our political system, we offer this submission:

1. Abolish territorial constituencies, and
2. Grant each voter multiple votes—say, a dozen.

One empowers the leaders and the other, the voters. Together, these two changes would transform the political system from the inside out and lay the foundation for a wave of positive developments. Most major and minor problems that plague the current system would begin to resolve themselves. The nation's progress would accelerate, and governance would start to reflect the true spirit of the Constitution. Life would improve—for voters, for leaders, for super leaders (those aspiring to become Prime Minister or Chief Minister), and for political parties themselves.

We urge all political parties to come together to introduce and pass a bill in Parliament enacting these two fundamental reforms.

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Without constituencies, leaders are no longer confined to seeking votes within the boundaries of a territorial constituency. They no longer need to pretend to be all things to all people across diverse communities and professions within a fixed area. Instead, they can appeal to voters across the entire state or nation. Leaders may choose to focus on broad issues that affect everyone—such as infrastructure, education, or health—or dedicate themselves to the specific needs and aspirations of particular population segments, such as Dalits, farmers, Divyangs, nomadic tribes, or environmentalists. By offering a compelling vision supported by thoughtful policies, programs, and services, they can build their own voter bases—just as entrepreneurs build customer bases by offering compelling products and services that meet the unmet needs and aspirations of different segments of society.

Each section of the population—be it SC, ST, BC, OBC, FC, or any sub-caste—would no longer be fragmented into small slices within individual constituencies. Instead, each group could unite across the state or nation to elect leaders of its own, achieving fair representation in proportion to its actual numbers—without resorting to a cumbersome and unreliable caste census, which risks labeling even caste-indifferent, caste-averse, or caste-less voters as casteist; and without relying on reserved constituencies, which, despite seven decades of implementation, have failed to uplift weaker sections and continue to violate democratic principles by forcing voters of all castes to elect leaders from a specific caste. The no-constituency model—requiring neither reserved constituencies nor a caste census—spares the nation the damaging prospect of freezing our political system, and with it our society, into a rigid caste framework for eternity.

In the no-constituency model, leaders are ranked based on the total number of votes they receive from across the state or nation. The top 543 (or the corresponding number at the state level) are declared elected. This approach can also be described as a top-rankers system. In this model, leaders do not compete directly against one another—except when they happen to appeal to the same small segment of the population—and no one risks losing an election by a narrow margin unless they are near the bottom of the top-543 list.

In the current system, most winning candidates secure their seats with only about 30% of the vote, leaving the remaining 70% of the electorate to be represented by someone they did not choose. With this pattern repeating across every constituency, in every election, the nation is effectively placed under perpetual minority rule—a deeply undemocratic outcome that often goes unnoticed.

By contrast, in the no-constituency model, no voter is represented by a leader chosen by others. Leaders represent only those who actively voted for them. This fosters a new kind of political relationship—one rooted in mutual choice and clarity. Leaders offer a specific vision to a clearly identified voter base, and voters in turn can hold them accountable for delivering on that vision.

This is a far cry from the current arrangement, where elected leaders are expected to represent the entire electorate of their constituency—including those who voted against them or abstained altogether. The result is a kind of arranged, forced, or symbolic marriage between voters and leaders—often marked by weak, uneasy, or even antagonistic relationships, leading to low expectations, widespread voter apathy, disillusionment, and a sense of helplessness.

n the top-rankers model, the voter bases of elected leaders can vary widely in size. To ensure fair representation in the legislature for the voters they represent, each leader will be granted Proportional Voting Power—that is, their voting strength on the floor will be directly proportional to the number of votes they received. This ensures that every leader's influence in the legislature accurately reflects the level of public support they command, making legislative decisions more representative of the people's will.

In the current system, leaders often have to mortgage their independence to political parties just to secure a ticket to contest elections. In the no-constituency model, however, leaders—supported by their own voter bases—are no longer trapped in the recurring uncertainty of securing a party ticket or losing an election by a narrow margin. This newfound stability allows them to build lasting relationships with voters, engage in honest and meaningful dialogue, and offer long-term visions and genuine solutions, rather than relying on short-term populist measures. Voters, too, would no longer have to worry about their preferred leaders being sidelined—either for lacking a party ticket or for not maintaining a comfortable lead over a rival.

Leaders may still choose to join political parties to gain additional support during campaigning—but largely on their own terms, backed by their own voter bases. They retain the freedom to exercise independent judgment both inside and outside the legislature. As a result, debates and votes in the legislature would become more issue-based rather than whip-driven—a practice that has long stifled the plurality of opinion, which is the very essence of democracy, and an affront to the judgment of leaders as well as an insult to the voters who placed their trust in them.

In the current system, political parties fight tooth and nail because even a small drop in vote share can result in a disproportionately large loss of seats. This pressure compels them to field candidates with heavy muscle and money power—one of the root causes of widespread criminality and corruption. Fielding a "wrong candidate" risks not only internal dissent but also losing the election itself.

In the new model, the entire pre-poll dynamic changes fundamentally. Political parties no longer need to identify "winnable" candidates for each constituency—because constituencies no longer exist. Instead, they would publish an endorsed list of candidates from across the state or nation—leaders known for their commitment to specific issues, fields, or communities. Voters can then choose any of them based on alignment with their own priorities and values. The total support a party enjoys is reflected in the cumulative votes its endorsed leaders receive, which directly translates into its voting power in the legislature.

In the current model, super leaders—those aspiring to the top posts of Prime Minister or Chief Minister—must either amass significant clout within an existing political party or establish a new one. In contrast, under the new model, such leaders need only earn the respect and trust of their fellow elected representatives—based on merit, vision, and public credibility—to rise to the top, much like the great leaders Atal Bihari Vajpayee and P. V. Narasimha Rao, who earned the admiration not only of their own party members but also of leaders across party lines.

The new model also compensates for the lack of internal democracy within political parties—and even renders internal elections unnecessary. While sycophants or close associates of party leaders may still find a place on the party's endorsed list, they won't get elected without genuine voter support. Party supporters are no longer forced to back candidates imposed on them by party calculations; they can vote only for leaders they truly trust.

The current system, by allowing only one vote, forces voters to choose a single party over all others. That vote is then interpreted as full support for the chosen party and complete rejection of the rest. In reality, however, most voters are party-neutral—they view parties as broadly similar, with only marginal differences, and may favor one slightly more than the others at a given time. Granting multiple votes allows voters to express this nuanced preference more accurately, distributing their votes among different parties in proportion to how much they favor each.

Furthermore, under the current system, a single vote is treated as an endorsement of the party's entire manifesto, with no mechanism for voters to specify which parts they support and which they do not. As a result, they often end up endorsing policies they fundamentally disagree with. In contrast, under the no-constituency system, voters can indicate which policies they endorse—and which they do not—by distributing their votes among individual leaders whose vision and proposals they agree with. Political parties can no longer claim a blanket mandate for their entire manifesto.

It is important to note that the Constitution envisions a democracy where voters elect individual leaders—not political parties. Political parties, after all, are extra-constitutional entities—pre-poll alliances formed around influential leaders, shared ideologies, or historical circumstances.

As voters begin distributing their votes across multiple parties and leaders, a new phenomenon emerges: "sharing the voter," much like how banks share customers. Parties and leaders can no longer afford to demonize or be hostile toward one another—whether during elections or in the legislature—as doing so risks alienating voters who may support both.

This system also disrupts traditional vote-bank politics, which have long been sustained by political parties through divisive and appeasement strategies. First, when voters are empowered to support leaders who genuinely represent their issues, causes, and aspirations, they are far less likely to fall for token appeasement. Second, divisive politics lose their edge because voters with multiple concerns—and multiple votes to express them—can no longer be boxed into a single identity group or voting bloc. A Dalit teacher who is also a Divyang, for instance, simultaneously belongs to the

Dalit community, the teaching community, and the disability community. A BC artist is part of both a caste group and the entertainment industry. A woman from a farming family who cares about agriculture, women's issues, and her children's education may distribute her votes among three different leaders—possibly from different parties or even independents—completely defying conventional vote-bank arithmetic.

In the current model, only issues that are populist, controversial, or appeal to the whims and fancies of super leaders tend to receive attention. In contrast, in the new model, every issue that affects a significant portion of the population is likely to be identified by one leader or another, given due attention, and brought up for debate in the legislature. At the same time, no one can exaggerate or downplay any issue disproportionately, as the size of the voter bases of leaders dedicated to various issues clearly indicates each issue's relative significance.

Moreover, no leader can enact a bill into law solely on the strength of their own voting power. Every leader must actively seek the support of others who are committed to different issues and causes. As a result, each leader has a say not only in legislation concerning their own focus area but also in matters beyond it. This interdependence fosters a culture of positive and constructive collaboration.

Leaders also cannot afford to blindly support or oppose any proposal; they must evaluate each issue with great caution—if for no other reason than the possibility that they share portions of their voter base with other leaders. Even those championing potentially conflicting issues—such as the environment and infrastructure—must collaborate to develop reasonable solutions they can justify to their constituents as well as to fellow legislators whose support they need.

In this model, leadership is tested on two essential fronts: convincing voters during elections of one's vision and priorities, and persuading fellow legislators to support those ideas in the legislature—hallmarks of genuine leadership and democratic politics. This stands in stark contrast to the current system, where the super leader of the ruling party can claim a sweeping mandate for any obscure item in the manifesto and steamroll it into law using the anti-democratic whip mechanism.

Without constituencies, the contentious issue of delimitation disappears. Lok Sabha leaders are no longer tied to regional identities, as they represent national issues and draw their voter base from across the country. Leaders from developed regions can attract votes from underdeveloped areas, and vice versa. This model rightly decouples national leaders from regional identities. A leader from Assam focused on sports, for instance, would be seen as a national figure, not merely as an Assamese leader—just as Gandhi, Bose, and Bhagat Singh were regarded as national icons, not confined to their Gujarati, Bengali, or Punjabi roots. This model restores the Lok Sabha's original constitutional role: a forum of nationally focused leaders representing national interests. The Rajya Sabha, as intended, remains the chamber for representing state interests.

Also, in this model, both national and state elections are completely decoupled from local factors, factions, and issues. As a result, the criminality and corruption associated with these local dynamics would largely disappear. Local gangs, with no specific local party leader to back, would lose their political relevance and become inactive. Muscle power—which may be effective in influencing localized voter bases within constituencies—becomes inadequate when voter bases are spread across an entire state or the nation. Similarly, money power loses its edge when incentives must be distributed across a widely dispersed electorate.

Political parties may still attempt to distribute cash incentives at the state or national level, even under this model. However, when all parties engage in such tactics, inducements become an ineffective—necessary but not sufficient—tool for winning votes, as is already evident in the current

system. Voters, like gods, have grown accustomed to accepting offerings from all and bestowing blessings only on the deserving. They are likely to behave similarly in the new model—accepting inducements, if any, from all sides, but distributing their votes among parties and leaders as they see fit. Moreover, pricked by conscience, many may choose to give one or two of their multiple votes to leaders of integrity and principle. The presence of such leaders would play a crucial role in restoring dignity to public discourse and legislative integrity—both of which are currently in serious decline.

The Constitution envisions the legislature as a watchdog over the executive. However, the current party-based model undermines this vision, as the executive is formed by the very party that holds a majority in the legislature. How can we expect a political party to hold accountable the executive it brought to power? In contrast, under the proposed system, every elected leader commands an independent voter base and is free from the political compulsions that demand loyalty to a non-performing executive. This restores the legislature's intended role as a true check on executive power.

The current system suffers from a serious yet often overlooked flaw: the loss of capable parliamentarians due to narrow electoral defeats. Many competent leaders with valuable experience and insight are sidelined for an entire term simply because they fall short by a small margin—often for reasons unrelated to their merit or performance. At a time when quality leadership is already scarce, this kind of "leadership leak" resulting from constituency-based elections is not just unfortunate—it is unforgivable. In the proposed model, no such loss occurs. Every leader who commands sufficient public support is elected—regardless of who else wins more or fewer votes. This ensures the nation fully harnesses and integrates all the top political talent available.

Another peculiar feature of our current system is the practice of allowing candidates to contest from multiple constituencies. In the proposed model, this becomes both impossible and unnecessary—impossible because there are no constituencies, and unnecessary because a candidate's support is aggregated from across the entire nation or state.

By-elections, which are often costly and disruptive, would become unnecessary under the top-rankers model. In the event of a legislator's death, disqualification, or resignation, the next candidate in line—based on the original vote tally, such as the 544th-ranked candidate in the case of the Lok Sabha—can simply be declared elected.

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The current Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs), which can accommodate a maximum of only 384 candidates, are inadequate for the proposed model—where thousands of candidates may need to appear on each machine across a state or the nation. To address this, we propose the development of Advanced Voting Machines (AVMs) capable of handling a significantly larger number of candidates. These machines should also allow voters to cast multiple votes easily and intuitively, while retaining essential security features such as VVPAT. A basic design of the AVM-based voting process—featuring touchscreens and QR code scanners—is available at www.isopr.in/voting.

By combining the voter authentication methods developed for Remote Voting Machines (RVMs) with the capabilities of Advanced Voting Machines (AVMs), voters can be empowered to cast their ballots from anywhere in the state or country. This would eliminate the need for individuals—such as business travelers, migrant workers, or members of nomadic communities—to return to their native place to vote. The added flexibility would also enhance voter anonymity, enabling people to vote in locations where they are less likely to face social pressure or subtle coercion to support any particular party or candidate.

The Constituent Assembly, in its time, might well have embraced a no-constituency, multiple-vote model for its many advantages. However, constrained by the limitations of the paper ballot system, it had to settle for a constituency-based, single-vote structure—fully aware of its shortcomings, yet hopeful that leaders with integrity would not exploit them. That hope, as we now know, has proved to be only a wish.

Today, we stand at a far more advanced stage of human and technological development. Digital-age innovations now make a no-constituency, multiple-vote system entirely feasible. Just as we revolutionized banking with UPI and continue to reap its transformative benefits, the time has come to bring our political system into the digital era—with Advanced Voting Machines (AVMs)—and unlock the transformative potential outlined thus far.

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